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NOTES
TRADE PROTECTION VS. TRADE PROMOTION: ARE




Millions of Americans fear losing their jobs due to outsourc-
ing.' According to a poll concerning Americans' attitudes
toward international trade that was completed in early 2004,
forty-one percent of respondents viewed the process of increas-
ing international trade through reduction of barriers as proceed-
ing too quickly; this number had increased from thirty percent in
1999.2 However, some studies show that trade protectionism,
particularly the Section 201 steel tariffs imposed in March 2002,
as well as the longstanding sugar tariff program, have resulted in
the loss of American jobs in sectors that consume a protected
product.3 One study claimed that more American workers lost
their jobs in 2002 to higher steel prices than the total number
employed by the U.S. steel industry itself.4 Additionally, barriers
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1. See Gary C. Hufbauer & Yee Wong, Grading Growth: The Trade Legacy of
President Bush, I-Lv. Ir'L REv., Summer 2004, at 76.
2. STEVEN KULL ET AL., PIPA/KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS, AMERICANS ON
GLOBALIZATION, TRADE, AND FARM SUBSIDIES 9 (2004), available at http://www.
pipa.org/OnlineReports/Globalization/GlobalTradeFarmJanO4/GlobalTrade
Farm_Jan04_-rpt.pdf.
3. See generally JOSEPH FRANCOIS & LAuRA M. BAUGHMAN, CITAC FOUND.,
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. STEEL TARIFFS: A QUANTIFICATION OF
THE IMPACT DURING 2002 (2003), available at http://citac.info/remedy/2002-
JobStudy.pdf.
4. Id. at "Executive Summary" ("187,500 Americans were employed by
steel producers in December 2002," while "200,000 Americans lost their jobs to
higher steel prices during 2002.").
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to international trade increase the cost of goods and decrease
the standard of living for all American consumers, disproportion-
ately lessening spending power for the poorest Americans.5
According to a recent study by the U.S. International Trade
Commission, trade liberalization in various sectors would reduce
the prices of common household goods like sugar, apparel, foot-
wear, and leather products.
6
The free trade debate is nothing new to business, labor,
environmental, and academic groups. Despite the dangers of
protectionism in destroying jobs in "downstream" sectors7 and
leading to large, inequitable payouts to a small number of
domestic producers, 8 opponents of free trade dubbed the 2003
round of trade negotiations on the proposed Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA) "Miami Vice"9 and warned that it "would
expand the failed NAFTA model."1 ° Although the FTAA negoti-
ations stalled from late 2003 through mid-2004, a WTO accord in
August 2004 breathed life back into negotiations for a trade area
encompassing Alaska to Argentina.'" While FTAA proponents
had hoped to finish negotiations on the agreement by January
2005, the talks will probably not conclude until at least 2007.12
The idea for the FTAA, which would unite the economies of
North, Central, and South America into a single free trade agree-
5. See generally EDWARD GRESSER, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., TOUGHEST ON
THE POOR: TAIFFS, TAXES, AND THE SINGLE MOM (2002), http://www.ppionline.
org/documents/Tariffs Poor_0902.pdf [hereinafter GRESSER, TOUGHEST ON
THE POOR]; Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice Chairman, Federal Reserve, Remarks
at the Conference on Trade and the Future of American Workers (Oct. 7,
2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/
20041007/default.htm.
6. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUBL'N No. 3701, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF SIGNIFICANT U.S. IMPORT RESTRAINTS: FOURTH UPDATE 2004, at 20, 76, 81
(2004), available at http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/pubs/332/pub3701.pdf.
According to the study, sectoral trade liberalization would lower the price of
sugar for U.S. consumers by eight percent, apparel by five percent, and foot-
wear and leather products by four percent.
7. Downstream sectors are those sectors that use protected goods as input
in making other goods, such as a company that manufactures metal stampings.
See Ferguson, supra note 5.
8. See id.
9. Aziz Choudry, Miami Vice: The FFAA Returns to Florida, NEW ORLEANS
INDEP. MEDIA CTR., Nov. 12, 2003, http://neworleans.indymedia.org/news/
2003/11/620.php.
10. AFL-CIO Executive Council, Free Trade Area of the Americas Ministerial
in Miami: An Action Plan to Opose the F-AA, AFL-CIO, Feb. 27, 2003, http://
www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/ecouncil/ec02272003k.cfm.
11. Stephen Temple, Wl'O Result Breathes New Life into Free Trade Area of the
Americas, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Aug. 4, 2004.
12. Id.
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ment (IFTA), began back in 1994, at the Summit of the Americas,
which was held in Miami. 3
Proposals seeking to free trade in the Middle East' 4 and
Asia, 5 which have received less press than the FTAA, have also
floundered. Such proposals, which could be linked to improving
democracy in countries seeking preferential trade status with the
United States, would assist countries left off the list of FTA
contenders.
This Note assesses the prudence of using FTAs, particularly
the proposed FTAA, and other proposals that reduce barriers to
free trade despite some negative immediate impacts on Ameri-
can jobs. Retaining current jobs, particularly in the manufactur-
ing industry, has an intrinsic value because it lessens disruptions
to not only workers, but also their families and sometimes their
entire communities. Therefore sectors that could be harmed by
a proposed FTA should be allowed some meaningful contribu-
tion to the negotiations. Nevertheless, this Note concludes that
most of organized labor's concerns with FTAs are overstated and
misplaced, as productivity growth, not trade, is the more likely
cause of job losses in the hardest-hit sectors of the American
economy.
Part I of this Note explains the recent history of FTAs negoti-
ated by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the impact of
these agreements on liberalizing trade in protected sectors of the
American economy. Part II studies the effects of trade protec-
tionism and its harmful impact on certain sectors. Part III dis-
cusses the implementation of the FFAA and its likely positive
impact on overall job growth and creation in the United States.
Part IV addresses the proposed FTAA and other free trade pro-
posals from an ethical standpoint, analyzing the value of workers
retaining their current jobs and the desirability of better-paying
jobs and lower consumer prices. Part V explains why the FTAA
and other trade proposals should strive to eliminate protectionist
barriers on sensitive products, such as certain agricultural goods,
in order to create a more uniform trade policy for the United
States.
13. NozoMi SAGARA, RES. INST. OF ECON., TRADE & INDUST., PROVISIONS
FOR TRADE REMEDY MEASURES (ANTI-DUMPING, COUNTERVAILING AND SAFEGUARD
MEASURES) IN PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 20 (2002), http://www.rieti.go.
jp/jp/publications/dp/02eO13.pdf.
14. See, e.g., Middle East Trade and Engagement Act, S. 1121, 108th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
15. See, e.g., Nepal Garment Act, S. 662, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT U.S.-NEGOTIATED FREE
TRADE PROPOSALS
The WTO allows its members to form preferential trade
agreements, namely customs unions' 6 and free-trade areas, 7 to
complement the WTO's multilateral trade regime.1 8 Although
the United States has not attempted to form any customs unions,
it has focused on creating FTAs. The U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area
was the first FTA the United States negotiated, and it entered
into force in 1985. " The FTA "provide [d] for the elimination of
duties for merchandise from Israel entering the United States. "20
The historic U.S.-Canada FTA,2 1 which went into effect in 1989,
significantly liberalized trade between the world's largest trading
partners and set the stage for the passage of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) five years later.22 After the pas-
sage of Trade Promotion Authority in 2002, U.S. FTA negotia-
tions have significantly increased.
Following NAFTA's macroeconomic successes in increased
exports and investment flows, increased total trade, and
increased productivity in all three member states, the USTR has
successfully negotiated other FTAs with countries hoping to gain
the same benefits that Mexico and Canada have gained from
NAIFTA. Since the year 2000, the USTR has concluded bilateral
FTAs with Jordan, Singapore, Chile, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain,
16. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. 24, 8(a), Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATr]. In a customs union:
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce . . . are elimi-
nated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent
territories of the union," and "substantially the same duties and other
regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the
union to the trade of territories not included in the union.
Id. (emphasis added).
17. Id. at I 8(b). A free-trade area is defined as "a group of two or more
customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of com-
merce ... are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent
territories in products originating in such territories." Id. (emphasis added).
18. See World Trade Org., Regionalism: Friends or Rivals?, http://www.
wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/ifLe/beyle.htm (last visited Mar. 19,
2006).




21. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M.
281 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
22. Jordan B. Goldstein, Dispute Resolution Under Chapter 19 of the United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Did the Parties Get What They Bargained For?, 31
STAN. J. INT'L L. 275, 275 (1995).
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and Oman.23 Additionally, the United States, five Central Ameri-
can countries, and the Dominican Republic signed the Central
America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-
DR), which was approved in 2005 by the U.S. Congress. 24 The
USTR is also negotiating FFAs with Malaysia, Panama, the
Republic of Korea, the Southern African Customs Union, Thai-
land, and the United Arab Emirates. 25 It is too early to tell
exactly what impact the recently concluded trade agreements
have had on American workers. However, recent data on the
Chile FTA show favorable export increases for both countries,26
so the United States and potential FTA partners will likely rely on
this data in negotiating more FTAs around the globe in the com-
ing years.
Although the WTO would ultimately be the best forum for
addressing trade disparities because it can provide blanket pro-
posals that involve a large number of countries, the Doha
Round's 27 prospects are complex, as tariff reform is almost always
linked to agricultural subsidy cuts, services trade policy, and
other issues.2' Nevertheless, limited steps can be taken that may
lead to FTAs in the future. For instance, in May 2003, Sens. Max
Baucus (D-MT) and John McCain (R-AZ) proposed the Middle
East Trade and Engagement Act, 29 which would have authorized
the president to extend duty-free treatment to countries of the
"greater Middle East," thereby eliminating tariffs on reforming
23. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Bilateral Trade Agreements,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade.Agreements/Bilateral/Section_Index.
html (last visited Mar. 19, 2006) [hereinafter Bilateral Trade Agreements].
24. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of
USTR Spokesman Stephen Norton Regarding CAFTA-DR Implementation
(Dec. 30, 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/Press_
Releases/2005/December/Statement of USTRSpokesmanStephenNorton
_RegardingCAFTA-DRImplementation.html.
25. See Bilateral Trade Agreements, supra note 23.
26. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, The U.S.-Chile Free Trade
Agreement: An Early Record of Success (June 4, 2004), http://www.ustr.gov/
DocumentLibrary/FactSheets/2004/TheUS-ChileFreeTradeAgreement
.An EarlyRecord of Success.html.
27. The Doha Development Round began with the November 2001 decla-
ration of the WTO's Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, which pro-
vided the mandate for negotiations among WTO members about a range of
subjects, including agriculture and services, as well as issues regarding the
implementation of current WTO agreements. World Trade Org'n, DOHA Dev.
Agenda: Negotiations, Implementation and Development http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/dda-e/ddae.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2006).
28. EDWARD GRESSER, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., HOOVER'S LAST LEGACY:
TIME TO Fix AMERIcA's TARIrr SYSTEM 6 (2005), http://www.ppionline.org/doc-
uments/hoovertariff 0113.pdf [hereinafter GRESSER, HOOVER'S LAST LEGACY].
29. Middle East Trade and Engagement Act, supra note 14.
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Muslim-world nations.3 ° Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) pro-
posed a similar measure for Nepal, legislation that would have
granted duty-free status to Nepalese textile and apparel imports
in the United States, thereby giving Nepal the same status
granted to participating countries under the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA).
Besides AGOA, the United States has two other regional
trade-preference programs that provide duty-free access to the
U.S. market: the U.S.-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act and
the Andean Trade Preference Act. 2 According to economic
analyist Edward Gresser, " [t ] hese programs have limitations, but
all attempt to eliminate tariffs on clothes and some agricultural
products."3 3 However, no serious effort has been made for Asia
or the Muslim world.34 The U.S. interest in promoting growth in
the Muslim world and Asia should be just as strong as its interest
in encouraging economic development in the Western Hemi-
sphere and Sub-Saharan Africa, especially with respect to Ameri-
can political aims in fomenting support for the war on
terrorism.3 5
II. A STUDY OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROTECTIONISM
In 1930, the U.S. Congress passed the infamous Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act of 1930,36 which many commentators have pro-
posed led to reactionary increases in tariffs, causing the Great
Depression.3 7 In more recent economic history, according to the
30. Id.; BRINK LINDSEY, CATO INST., THE TRADE FRONT: COMBATING TER-
RORISM WITH OPEN MARKETS 10 (2003), available at http://www.freetrade.org/
pubs/pas/tpa-024.pdf [hereinafter LINDSEY, THE TRADE FRONT]; GRESSER, Hoo-
VER'S LAST LEGACY, supra note 28, at 6.
31. Nepal Garment Act, supra note 15; GRESSER, HOOVER'S LAST LEGACY,
supra note 31, at 6; Press Release, Office of U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein, Sena-
tor Feinstein Introduces Legislation to Promote Economic and Political Stabil-
ity in Nepal, Mar. 19, 2003, available at http://feinstein.senate.gov/03Releases/
r-nepal.htm.
32. LINDSEY, THE TRADE FRONT, supra note 30, at 10.
33. GRESSER, HOOVER'S LAST LEGACY, supra note 28, at 3.
34. Id.
35. LINDSEY, THE TRADE FRONT, supra note 30, at 10.
36. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
37. See STEPHEN D. COHEN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. FOREIGN TRADE
POLICY 32 (1996); ROBERT A. PASTOR, CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF U.S. FOR-
EIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, 1929-1976, at 79 (1980); Harold Hongju Koh, Congres-
sional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking After I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & PoL. 1191, 1194-95 (1986); MarioJ. Crucini &James Kahn, Tariffs
and Aggregate Economic Activity: Lessons from the Great Depression, 38 J. MONETARY
ECON. 427 (1996); Harold Hongju Koh, The Legal Markets ofInternational Trade:
A Perspective on the Proposed United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 12 YALE J.
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current Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve, "the record of
Latin America, India, and other regions that experimented with
'import-substituting industrialization,' point to the deterioration
in economic performance that occurs when countries erect barri-
ers to trade."s Vice Chairman Ferguson sums up the drawbacks
of protectionism as follows:
Because they inhibit free trade, protectionist actions have
an array of adverse consequences that one would expect:
They reduce variety and raise costs for consumers; they dis-
tort the allocation of resources in the economy by encour-
aging excessive resources to flow into protected sectors;
and they foster inefficiency by reducing the extent of
competition. 9
These consequences can be seen in the aftermath of the 2002
steel tariffs, in the longstanding protectionism of the sugar indus-
try in the United States, and in the protection of other goods like
inexpensive shoes and apparel.
A. The 2002 Steel Tariffs and their Unintended Results
In March 2002, the Bush administration enacted steel tariffs
with the purported expectation of protecting the U.S. steel
industry and its workers from foreign dumping.4 ° The adminis-
tration imposed an average thirty-percent tariff on selected for-
eign steel entering the United States.4 1 By April 2002, many
major American trade par tners filed charges with the WTO's Dis-
INT'L LAW 193, 201-02 (1987);John Linarelli, International Trade Relations and
the Separation of Powers Under the United States Constitution, 13 DICK.J. INT'L L. 203,
210-11 (1995); C. O'Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agree-
ments: Why the NAFTA Turned into a Battle, 28 G.W. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 2, 17 &
n.62 (1994); Theresa Wilson, Note, Who Controls International Trade? Congres-
sional Delegation of the Foreign Commerce Power, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 141, 166 (1998);
Laura L. Wright, Note, Trade Promotion Authority: Fast Track for the Twentyfirst
Century?, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 979, 983 & n.39 (2004); Ferguson, supra
note 5.
38. Ferguson, supra note 5 (citing JAGDISH BHAGWATI, INDIA IN TRANSI-
TION: FREEING THE ECONOMY (1993); DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE
(2002); Alan M. Taylor, Three Phases of Argentine Economic Growth, published at 12
REVISTA DE HISTORIA ECONOMICA 649 (1994)).
39. Id.
40. Kevin K. Ho, Comment, Trading Rights and Wrongs: The Bush 2002 Steel
Tariffs, 21 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 825, 825 (2003); see also Proclamation No. 7529,
67 Fed. Reg. 10553 (Mar. 5, 2002). "Dumping" is said to occur when "a com-
pany exports its product at a price lower than the price it normally charges on
its home market." World Trade Org., Anti-dumping, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/adp-e/adp-e.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
41. Ho, supra note 40, at 826; see also Payment of Duties on Certain Steel
Products, 67 Fed. Reg. 12860 (Mar. 20, 2002) (codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 141).
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pute Settlement Body in Geneva, asking for mandatory consulta-
tions.4 2 In August 2002, the Bush administration nearly crippled
the tariffs by allowing over seven hundred exclusions.4" After an
adverse WTO decision and the threat of European sanctions, the
United States revoked the steel tariffs in December 2003.
44
Critics of the steel tariffs, such as U.S. SenatorJohn McCain,
estimated that for every steel-producing job the tariffs attempted
to save, thirteen others in steel-consuming industries were endan-
gered by the tariffs.45 The steel tariffs, along with other market-
place difficulties, increased steel costs for American companies
utilizing steel as part of the production of goods. Researchers for
the Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition (CITAC) Steel
Task Force set out to ascertain exactly how many American jobs
were affected by the 2002 steel tariffs. CITAC announced the
results in early 2003, which showed that nearly 200,000 jobs in
steel-consuming industries were lost in 2002, caused in large part
by the Section 201 steel tariffs.4 6 The researchers assert that
"[s] teel consumers have lost more jobs to higher steel costs than
the total number employed by steel producers in December 2002
(187,500) .
According to the President of the Precision Metalforming
Association, more than twelve million Americans work in steel-
consuming jobs.48 Hence, although the tariffs were effectively
rolled back in August 2002, the steel-consuming industry suf-
fered serious job losses due to the price hike of the steel tariffs.
Further, the recent steel tariff program evidences the often ineq-
uitable results of protectionism, as the program led to very large
payouts to a small number of producers. For instance, even as
late as August 2004, two years after the major dismantling of the
2002 steel tariffs, over one-half of the antidumping49 and coun-
42. Ho, supra note 40, at 838.
43. Id. at 827.
44. Hufbauer & Wong, supra note 1.
45. Ho, supra note 40, at 833. Sen. McCain and other Republican sena-
tors relied on a Brookings Institution analysis that found that higher steel tariffs
could eliminate 86,000jobs at U.S. steel-using companies. Senate Leaders Would
Support Steel Tariffs, CNN, Mar. 4, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALL
POLITICS/03/04/bush.steel/index.html.
46. See FRANCOIS & BAUGHMAN, supra note 3, at 12.
47. Id.
48. Press Release, CITAC Study Shows 200,000Jobs Lost Nationwide from
High Steel Prices in 2002-Steel Tariffs an Important Cause (Feb. 4, 2003),
available at http://citac.info/release/2003/02_04.html. Steel users and others
whose jobs depend on steel "claim to represent 12.8 million people." Kristine
Henry, Steel Tariff Imports to Cut Both Ways, BALT. SUN, Mar. 3, 2002, at 1C.
49. The WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement permits governments to
counteract dumping, when there is genuine (defined as "material") injury to
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tervailing duty5" orders in place were on iron and steel-related
products alone; by contrast, less than one-half of one percent of
total private non-farm employment is accounted for by iron and
steel producers.5
B. Protecting Sugar and Orange Juice from Lower Prices
U.S. protection of the domestic sugar industry dates from
the Sugar Tariff of 1789,52 which was implemented as a revenue-
raising measure.53 For over two decades, a protectionist quota/
tariff regime and loan program have propped up U.S. sugar
prices compared to the rest of the world.54 Presidential Procla-
mation 6179"5 lays the basic framework for the current quota/
tariff regime in setting up a two-tiered tariff system, replacing the
previous absolute quota system.56 The primary instruments of
the U.S. sugar program, sugar import restrictions imposed by the
President and domestic sugar price supports established by Con-
gress, have long been attacked as contrary to both domestic and
international interests.
57
While many Americans are sympathetic to policies designed
to help the small farmer, the gains of the sugar program are con-
centrated among a small number of producers. 58 A 1993 Gen-
eral Accounting Office (GAO) study showed that forty-two
percent of the benefits from sugar protection accrued to a mere
the competing domestic industry. World Trade Org., Anti-dumping, Subsidies,
Safeguards: Contingencies, Etc., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis
_e/tife/agnn8_e.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2006) [hereinafter WTO, Anti-
dumping].
50. The WTO allows its members in certain circumstances to impose
countervailing duties, or extra duties, on subsidized imports which, after investi-
gation, are found to be damaging domestic producers. World Trade Org., Sub-
sidies and Countervailing Measures, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
scm e/scme.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
51. Ferguson, supra note 5.
52. Tariff Act of 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24.
53. Katherine E. Monahan, Note, U.S. Sugar Policy: Domestic and Interna-
tional Repercussions of Sour Law, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 325, 327
(1992).
54. Aaron Schwabach, How Free Trade Can Save the Everglades, 14 GEo.
INT'L ENVrTL. L. REv. 301, 306 (2001).
55. Proclamation No. 6179, 55 Fed. Reg. 38, 293 (Sept. 13, 1990). See 15
C.F.R. §§ 2011, 2015 (2001); 19 C.F.R. § 132.17 (2001).
56. See Schwabach, supra note 54, at 309 & n.59 (detailing the history of
changes to the quota/tariff regime).
57. Monahan, supra note 53, at 325.
58. Ferguson, supra note 5.
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one percent of growers. 59 Additionally, sugar protectionism
saves a small number of jobs at the expense of risking a great
deal more jobs in sugar-consuming industries. A U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission (USITC) study reveals that there are
approximately 61,000 full-time-equivalent jobs in the U.S. sugar-
producing industry. 6° However, in 2002, the Commerce Depart-
ment counted approximately 987,810 Americans working in
sugar-using industries.61 As the U.S. sugar program makes it less
expensive to manufacture sugar-containing products abroad for
export to the United States, more than ten times as many Ameri-
cans face possible job cuts because of the U.S. sugar program
than are assisted by it. 62 The U.S. sugar program, according to
studies cited by the Commerce Department, assists in keeping
about 2260 sugar industry employees, many of whom work in
growing and harvesting jobs, at an annual cost per job saved of
$826,000.63
By contrast, a study commissioned by the Sweetener Users
Association calculated that between 7500 and 10,000 jobs in
sugar-using industries have been lost since 1997 due to artificially
high sugar prices.64 Moreover, the USITC recently conducted a
59. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-93-84, SUGAR PROGRAM:
CHANGING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS REQUIRE PROGRAM
CHANGES 3 (1993), available at http://archive.gao.gov/+2pbat6/149198.pdf.
60. AARON LUKAS, CATO INST., A STICKY STATE OF AFFAIRS: SUGAR AND THE
U.S.-AUSTRALIA FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT (2004), available at http://www.free
trade.org/pubs/FTBs/FB-008.html (citing U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, INVST'N
No. 332-325, PUBL'N No. 3519, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SIGNIFICANT U.S.
IMPORT RESTRAINTS: THIRD UPDATE 2002, at 75 (2002). The figure includes all
farm jobs involved in the growing and harvesting of sugarcane and sugar beets.
See also INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EMPLOYMENT CHANGES IN
U.S. FOOD MANUFACTURING: THE IMPACT OF SUGAR PRICES 4 (2006), available at
http://www.ita.doc.gov/media/Publications/pdf/sugar06.pdf [hereinafter
EMPLOYMENT CHANGES].
61. EMPLOYMENT CHANGES, supra note 60, at 4.
62. LUKAS, supra note 60.
63. EMPLOYMENT CHANGES, supra note 60, at 4 (citing GARY CLYDE HuF-
BAUER & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, MEASURING THE COSTS OF PROTECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES (1994); FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, THE FRUITS OF FREE
TRADE, 2002 ANNUAL REP.).
64. LUKAS, supra note 60 (citing Food & Beverage Jobs Disappearing Due to
Sugar Program, PROMAR INT'L REP., Dec. 2003). The same Sugar Users Associa-
tion study was cited by the Fraser Institute, which noted that the U.S. sugar
program was a factor in Kraft Foods' decision to relocate its Life Savers plant,
which employed about six-hundred people, from Michigan to Quebec, saving
an estimated US $10 million per year in sugar costs alone. See Todd Gabel et
al., Mr. President, Tear Down This Wall: How Trade Barriers Burden Businesses, Con-
sumers, & the Economy, FRASER FORUM, June 2004, at 15, available at http://www.
fraserinstitute.ca/admin/books/chapterfiles/Jun04ffGabel.pdf.
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study that indicated that trade liberalization would lower the
price of sugar for American consumers by eight percent.
65
Americans have often paid twice the world price for sugar,6 6 with
the effect of saving a minimal amount of American jobs at the
expense of many more jobs in sugar-consuming industries.
Concerning sugar protectionism's effect on the U.S. econ-
omy, the GAO estimated that the sugar program cost domestic
sweetener users $1.9 billion in 1998.67 The USITC separately
concluded that abolishing the U.S. sugar program would result
in a net annual welfare gain to the U.S. economy of $986 mil-
lion.6" Another study by the Australian Bureau of Agriculture
and Resource Economics claimed that if the United States unilat-
erally removed its sugar trade barriers, American consumers
would save about $1.6 billion per year, and the U.S. economy as a
whole would gain an additional net $456 million per year.69
Hence, the U.S. sugar program results in a net loss of welfare for
the U.S. economy, money that could be spent on worker training
programs, discussed infra in Part IV.C.
The U.S. tariff rate system puts up barriers to trade on
another staple product in most American households-orange
juice-by means of a specific tariff"7 °
To protect Florida citrus and orange juice production,
imports from outside NAFTA have to pay a specific tariff
rate of $0.297 per Single Strength Equivalent (SSE) gallon
for frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ) and $0.175
per SSE gallon for not-from-concentrate (NFC) orange
juice, corresponding to an equivalent ad valorem tariff rate
of 56.7% and 13.7% respectively.
7'
Mexican processing companies, as part of NAFTA, benefit from
preferential tariff rates, corresponding to an equivalent ad
valorem tariff rate of 30.7 percent for FCOJ and 6.4 percent for
65. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 6, at 20.
66. Schwabach, supra note 54, at 308; LuKAS, supra note 60.
67. MARK A. GROOMBRIDGE, CATO INST., AMERICA'S BITTERSWEET SUGAR
POLICY 3 (2001), available at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/briefs/tpb-013.




70. PAULO F. AZEVEDO ET AL., INTER-AM. DEV. BANK, THE FOOD INDUSTRY
IN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES: THE EFFECTS OF THE FTAA ON TRADE AND
INVESTMENT 42 (2004), available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocu-
men t.aspx?docnum=548054.
71. Id. at 53 (citing M.F. Neves et al., Cadeia: Citros, in ESTUDO DA COMPE-
TITIVIDADE DE CADEIAS INTEGRADAS NO BRASIL: IMPACTOS DAS ZONAS DE LIVRE
COMERCIO (L. Coutinho ed., 2002)).
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NFC orange juice.7 2 Although the Mexican tariff rate is still
high, the comparatively preferential rate has partially caused the
decline in Brazilian FCOJ exports to the U.S.7 3 Hence, the astro-
nomically high tariff rates placed on orange juice from Brazil
and other non-NAFTA countries have kept competition from the
Brazilian orange juice industry, which is the largest in the
world," down to an artificially low level and in effect created
higher prices for all U.S. consumers without seriously protecting
U.S. jobs.
C. The Surgical Protection of Other Goods
In addition to steel, sugar, and orange juice, the United
States seems to have carved out other specific goods and placed
extremely high tariffs on them in an effort to protect domestic
industries. Although the United States does tend to be more
open to international trade, especially relative to developing
countries, the United States also has the tendency to heavily pro-
tect selected goods from foreign competition.7 5 While some
authors conclude that "US tariff rates are selectively used to pro-
tect specific domestic industries,"" a closer look at some heavily
protected products reveals that U.S. employment in the produc-
tion of such goods appears to be nearly non-existent.
Consider the case of cheap sneakers. According to analyst
Edward Gresser, concerning sneakers costing less than three dol-
lars, U.S. "tariff policy combines high taxes with selective effects
on the poor and failure to protect jobs."7 7 Such shoes have a
tariff rate of forty-eight percent, which is one of the highest in
the U.S. tariff schedule, and there appears to be no American
employment in their production.7 8 The average cost per pair of
such imported shoes in 2001 was $2.20. 7" However, the U.S. Cus-
toms Service added $1.06 per pair in tariffs on these sneakers,
which retailers passed on, along with markups and state sales
taxes, increasing the final price in stores by about $1.60 per




75. Id. at 42.
76. Id.
77. GRESSER, TOUGHEST ON THE POOR, supra note 5, at 2.
78. Id. at 2-3. Gresser notes that only approximately "3000 Americans
are now employed making sneakers, and apparently none make very cheap
sneakers." Id. at 12.
79. Id. at 3.
80. Id.
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harder than company vice presidents because "l[t] ariffs are high-
est on the goods important to the poor."81
Another U.S. domestic sector protected by high tariffs is the
apparel industry. Women's apparel accounts for almost fifty per-
cent of a single-parent family's tariff bill, but employment in this
area has dropped rapidly.82 The United States now employs
fewer than 30,000 workers in making girls' and children's blouses
and dresses, women's underwear, women's shirts, and women's
shoes.83 Employment declines in other protected sectors like
watches, luggage, handbags, drinking glasses, and plates have
also been comparably fast.84 Research done by the USITC indi-
cates that removing trade barriers may mean no overall loss of
jobs and could actually lead to a net increase in employment.8 5
III. THE IMPACT OF FTAs ON JOB FLUCTUATION
A. NAFFA and Its Effect on U.S. Employment
Although the American Federation of Labor-Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and its supporters have con-
tinuously argued that NAFTA failed to meet its promises and
contributed to the loss of hundreds of thousands of U.S. jobs,86
the Office of the USTR portrays a different view of NAFTA as a
success story with respect to the American economy and job crea-
tion. The USTR claims that U.S. employment grew by twenty
million from 1993 to 2000.87 Between these opposing claims lies
a more nuanced picture ofjob fluctuation and non-trade-related
causes for job losses and gains.
81. Id. at 1.
82. Id. at 4.
83. Id. According to Gresser, who cited numbers from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics in 1992, the U.S. had 21,400jobs in girls' and children's blouses
and dresses, but in 2002, there were only 4800jobs. Similarly, employment in
women's underwear went down in the same period from 48,500 to 10,400jobs;
in women's shirts from 37,400 to 8900jobs; and in women's shoes from 23,700
to 3400 jobs.
84. Id. at 3-4.
85. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUBL'N No. 3519, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF SIGNIFICANT U.S. IMPORT RESTRAINTS: THIRD UPDATE XiX (2002), available at
http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/pubs/332/pub3519.pdf.
86. AFL-CIO, TIME TO CHOOSE: GOOD JOBS AND STRONG COMMUNITIES OR
NAFTA TIMES TEN? (2003), http://www.aflcio.org/issues/jobseconomy/global
economy/upload/Time-to-Choose-Good-Jobs-and-Strong-Communities-or-
NAFTA-Times-Ten.pdf.
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While the USTR gives a great deal of credit to NAFTA for
job creation over the last ten years, in the large scheme of the
economy international trade only modestly contributes to the
frenetic job turnover of the United States.88 In any event, total
U.S. private-sector jobs increased by 17.8 million between 1993
and 2002, so NAFTA cannot be blamed for causing net job
losses. 9  Concerning individual components of employment,
although the manufacturing sector has experienced some hard
hits in recent years,9 ° it is difficult to find any direct link to
NAFTA as a cause of the decline in manufacturing jobs. Between
2000 and 2003, while manufacturing employment fell by almost
2.8 million, imports of manufactured goods increased a mere 0.6
percent.91
Research on the effects of NAFTA has admittedly been
plagued by non-methodological limitations and the complexities
of undertaking such research. 92 Some major extraneous issues
that have affected research results include the following: antici-
pation of NAFTA began in 1990, affecting trade relations
between the three countries before the Agreement came into
force; the fact that not all tariffs were removed upon enactment
due to phasing-in periods on many categories of products from
between ten and fifteen years; and the increase in trade with
other nations, e.g., China, which had labor market effects on
NAFTA countries.93 As far as overall trade goes, however, the
consensus among most post-NAFTA econometric studies is that
the Agreement had a minimal effect on overall U.S. trade, which
had been predicted by studies prior to NAFTA.94
Pre-NAFTA studies differed on predictions as to NAFTA's
potential effects on employment, and similarly, post-NAFTA
research has not come to any consensus because of the difficul-
ties associated with attributing employment gains or losses solely
88. BRINK LINDSEY, CATO INST., JOB LOSSES AND TRADE: A REALITY CHECK
1 (2004), available at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/biefs/tb-019.pdf [here-
inafter LINDSEY, JOB LOSSES].
89. Id.
90. Kate Bronfenbrenner & Robert Hickey, Winning is Possible: Successful
Union Organizing in the United States-Clear Lessons, Too Few Examples, MULTINAT'L
MONITOR, June 2003, at 9.
91. LINDSEY, JOB LOSSES, supra note 88, at 1.
92. See generally MICHAEL ABBOTT, COMM'N FOR LABOR COOPERATION, THE
IMPACTS OF INTEGRATION AND TRADE ON LABOR MARKETS: METHODOLOGICAL
CHALLENGES AND CONSENSUS FINDINGS IN THE NAFTA CONTEXT 3 (2004), availa-
ble at http://naalc.org/english/pdf/WP-Eng.pdf.
93. Id. at 6-7 (citing Anne 0. Krueger, NAFTA Effects: A Preliminary Assess-
ment, 23 WORLD ECON. 761-75 (2000)).
94. Id. at 8.
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to NAETA.9" Studies that give a negative view of NAFTA's effects
on employment are hindered due to the fact that employment in
the United States has experienced strong gains since 1994, as dis-
cussed above.9 6 One method for locating NAFTA-relatedjob loss
is via certified NAFTA-Trade Adjustment Assistance Program
(NAFTA-TAA) petitions, and such petition and certification
numbers have been low in relation to the size of the U.S. econ-
omy.9 8 As of July 1999, there had only been a total of 238,051
certifications, and the yearly average has been declining since
NAFTA's enactment.9 9 In any event, many researchers note that
the effect of NAFTA on U.S. employment has been "miniscule"
because of the size of the U.S. economy coupled with its many
non-NAFTA trade partners. °0 0 Another analyst states, in refer-
ence to the U.S. economy:
Even if understated by a factor of two or three, job losses
due to NAFTA are dwarfed by other developments in the
U.S. economy. The same would be true for job gains as a
result of NAFTA, if we tried to measure these. This is the
main reason why job measurement is a faulty criterion for
evaluating NAFTA. Job creation and loss are overwhelm-
ingly a function of conditions in the U.S. economy. For-
eign trade with a single country is marginal in this
respect.' 0 '
Perhaps we can expect the FTAA to have more of an impact than
NAFTA on employment because the FTAA concerns trade with
more countries, but it is still important to keep in mind the basic
fact that the U.S. economy is so large and diverse that even an
FTA involving almost the entire Western Hemisphere is unlikely
to have a huge impact on net job creation or loss. Further, the
95. Id. at 12-13.
96. Id. at 13.
97. The U.S. government set up the NAFTA-TAA assistance program in
order to extend benefits, e.g., training and additional income, to workers whose
jobs have been displaced by imports from Canada and Mexico. Id. at 11.
98. Id.
99. Id. (citing Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda et al., The U.S. Employment Impacts
of North American Integration after NAFTA: A Partial Equilibrium Approach
(2000) (unpublished manuscript, North American Integration and Develop-
ment Center, School of Public Policy and Social Research, UCLA)). Neverthe-
less, Abbott notes that the numbers are likely underestimated because not all
U.S. NAFTA-induced job losers are aware of the program. Id.
100. Id. (citing Sandra Polaski, Jobs, Wages, and Household Income, in
NAFTA's PROMISE AND REALITY: LESSONS FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE
(Audley et al. eds., 2004)).
101. Id. at 9-10 (quoting SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, THE CTR. FOR STRATEGIC &
INT'L STUDIES, NAFTA AT THREE: A PROGRESS REPORT 12(1997)).
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United States has already significantly liberalized trade with Cen-
tral America, the Dominican Republic, Chile, and the Caribbean
countries in the last few years.
B. The FTAA's Impact on Job Loss and Creation of New Jobs
Despite the claims of U.S. labor unions, international trade
is actually a minimal factor in job loss in the United States, as
discussed in the previous section.l°2 Instead of blaming trade for
job loss, labor interests in the United States have greater hurdles
with which to contend. The most important factor that has
affected loss ofjobs in the last half century has been productivity
growth, not trade, outsourcing, or any of the other popular vil-
lains of late.' °3 According to one economist, "trade is only one
element in a much bigger picture of incessant turnover in the
U.S. job market."' 4
1. Trade as a Source of Shifting Jobs
One of the great strengths of the U.S. economy is its flexibil-
ity, especially when compared with European countries.
10 5
Because of this flexibility, some commentators predict that,
despite some job losses in the information technology (IT) sector
that can be attributed to off-shoring and trade, the resulting
price falls will promote the further spread of IT in important sec-
tors like health services and construction.106 Further, even
despite the new off-shoring trend, the Department of Labor is
forecasting almost a thirty-five percent increase in computer and
mathe-matical operations from 2002 to 2012.107 Also, the United
States often gains jobs through what is referred to as "in-sourc-
ing," or performing service jobs for other countries.10 8 The
102. Martin Baily, Address at the Joint Conference of the Cato Institute
and The Economist on Trade and the Future of American Workers (Oct. 7,
2004), available at http://cato.org/events/tradeconference/index.htm (offer-
ing audio and video of this address).
103. Greg Mankiw, Address at the Joint Conference of the Cato Institute
and The Economist on Trade and the Future of American Workers (Oct. 7,
2004), available at http://cato.org/events/tradeconference/index.html (offer-
ing audio and video of this address).
104. LINDSEY, JOB LOSSES, supra note 88, at 2.
105. See generally Danger Time for America, ECONOMIST, Jan. 12, 2006, at 15.
106. LINDSEY, JOB LOSSES, supra note 88, at 2.
107. Id.; Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Table 2. Employ-
ment by Major Occupational Group, 2002 and Projected 2012, available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecopro.t02.htm (last modified Dec. 5, 2005).
108. Ferguson, supra note 5.
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United States has consistently run a surplus in categories of the
balance of payments associated with trade in business services.109
2. Trading Up for Jobs
While the most recent recession has been especially difficult
for the manufacturing sector, now is not the time to look to pro-
tectionist trade measures in the hope of saving jobs.11 ° Protec-
tionist measures, such as the aforementioned steel tariffs enacted
by President Bush, serve to assist a very small segment of the U.S.
economy at the expense of American consumers as well as indus-
tries in foreign countries."' Protectionism has the detrimental
effect of leading to retaliation and increased tariffs abroad.
Instead, promoting FTAs such as the FTAA will serve to increase
the U.S. gross domestic product, as NAFTA has done, which on a
basic macroeconomic level will decrease unemployment.1 12
Additionally, it is necessary to look at the long-term economic
gains of free trade separately from short-term downward business
cycles. Some commentators have stated that trade and outsourc-
ing will lead to better jobs for American workers, just as the com-
puter revolution led the United States from agriculture into
better, higher-skilled service jobs. 1 3
As for specific potential consequences of the FFAA, one
comprehensive study of the effects of the proposed FTAA on the
U.S. and Brazilian food industries concludes that food manufac-
turing companies in the United States might have a competitive
advantage over similar companies in Brazil,114 which is a major
player in FTAA negotiations. The U.S. food system plays an
important role in the U.S. national economy and totaled $804
billion in the year 2000, accounting for 8.1 percent of U.S. GDP
and employing 12 percent of the American labor force.1" The
22,000 U.S. food processors in the year 2000 employed almost 1.5
million workers.11 6 If the FTAA is approved, some analysts
believe that U.S. food processors will be better placed than Euro-
pean firms to acquire food assets in Brazil." 7 Depending on the
109. Id.
110. See Mankiw, supra note 103.
111. Ferguson, supra note 5.
112. See Mankiw, supra note 103.
113. See generally Ferguson, supra note 5.
114. AZEVEDO ET AL., supra note 70, at 22.
115. Id. at 3 (citingJ.M. HARRS ET AL., U.S.D.A. ECON. RES. SERV., ACPdc.
ECON. REP. No. 811, THE U.S. FOOD MKTG. SyS., 2002: COMPETITION, COORDINA-
TION AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS IN TO THE 21ST CENTURY (2002)).
116. Id. at 57.
117. Id. at 58.
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complete elimination of trade barriers, two economists estimate
that tariff elimination under the FTAA or another free trade pro-
posal would increase U.S. agricultural exports to the Western
Hemisphere by twelve percent.118
However, with respect to trade between two of the largest
countries in the proposed FTAA, there may be less "changes in
trade barriers in the sectors particularly affected by tariff elimina-
tion, inasmuch as important Brazilian export products-such as
sugar and orange juice-are significant domestic products in the
United States and receive 'chirurgical protection' by means of
quotas and specific lump-sum tariffs." 9 Because the sugar and
orange juice sectors are organized by private interest groups in a
more effective way than consumers, American and Brazilian con-
flicting negotiating positions on market access for such goods
will likely arise in the FTAA talks.12 °
Nonetheless, the effective removal of trade barriers under
the proposed FTAA would encourage trade flows, foreign direct
investment, and specialization in the affected countries. 21 As a
result, consumers would gain from lower food prices and higher
quality products.' 22 Instead of propping up domestic industries
that are simply not as efficient as their foreign competitors, the
solution seems to be creating new sources of employment and
assisting affected workers through the Trade Adjustment Assis-
tance Act, as discussed infra in Part IV.C.
IV. ARE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS ETHICAL?
In view of the economic arguments available to contest or
support FTAs, a fundamental question remains: Is the formation
of an FTA, such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas, ethically
right? To answer this question, one must first decide whether
the retention of current American jobs, particularly in the manu-
facturing sector, is valuable in keeping some American commu-
nities viable despite economic downturn. If the answer is yes,
118. Id. at 42 (quotingJ. MONTEAGUDO & M. WATANUKI, INTER-AM. DEV.
BANK, IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL REFORM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION ON LATIN AMERICA: BRIGHT PROSPECTS OR DISTANT ILLUSIONS?
(2003)). U.S. exports would increase mostly to non-NAFTIA partners. Id. at 43.
119. Id. at 59.
120. Id.
121. Id. See generally Jacqueline Granados, Investor Protection and Foreign
Investment Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Prospects for the Western Hemisphere Under
Chapter 17 of the FJ'AA, 13 CARDOZOJ. INT'L& COMP. L. 189 (2005) (arguing that
the FTAA could bring a substantial increase in foreign direct investment to
Latin American countries).
122. AZEVEDO ET AL., supra note 70, at 59.
TRADE PROTECTON VS. TRADE PROMOTION
then one must ask whether there are other interests that retain-
ing these jobs will affect and, if so, whether the importance of
these interests overshadows the benefits of retaining currentjobs.
If enforcing an FTA does have a direct negative impact on
employment in certain communities, how can the U.S. govern-
ment alleviate the pain of displaced workers and make sure that
they get back on track?
A. The Value of Retaining Current Jobs
Many in the United States, especially those affiliated with
trade unions, argue that increased trade liberalization, by way of
FTAs, has contributed to the fall in U.S. manufacturing jobs.'2 3
Supporters of this view argue that FTAs have enabled producers
to find less expensive foreign labor for manufacturing jobs.1 2 4
Probably the most avid defense of curtailing trade in the expecta-
tion of keeping current American manufacturing jobs comes
from an AFL-CIO report:
Some economists attempt to blame the job decline on pro-
ductivity growth and the normal business cycle. They dis-
count or ignore growing evidence that the real roots of the
problem lie in the massive, steady exporting of U.S. manu-
facturing jobs to low-cost offshore labor markets and the
low-road business practices that drive this movement. 125
While free trade proponents concentrate on the economic bene-
fits of international trade, most unions express concern about
quality of life and U.S. domestic employment issues.1 26 A major-
ity of Americans expresses concern about the impact of trade on
American workers, according to a poll completed in early 2004.
Even when poll-makers emphasized that trade may generate new
jobs with higher wages, fifty-nine percent did not feel that the
123. See generally AFL-CIO Home Page, http://www.aflcio.org (last visited
Mar. 14, 2006); The Institute for Food and Development Policy/Food First
Home Page, http://www.foodfirst.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2006) (concerning
issues involving free trade and trade liberalization's effect on U.S. manufactur-
ing and labor unions).
124. See Indiana AFL-CIO, House-Passed Trade Deal Bad for U.S. Work-
ers (July 29, 2003), http://inaflcio.org/documents/news030729badtradedeal.
pdf.
125. JOEL YUDKEN & BOB BAUGH, AFL-CIO INDUS. UNION COUNCIL, WIs-
CONSIN JOB EXPORTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE TRADE PLAYS IN MANUFACTURING
JOB Loss 13 (2004), http://www.aflcio.org/issues/jobseconomy/manufactur-
ing/iuc/upload/wi-jobexports.pdf.
126. See generally AFL-CIO Homepage, supra note 123.
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creation of new jobs offsets the disruption for workers who lose
their jobs.
1 27
B. The Counter Values of Better-Paying Jobs and Lower Prices
One economist has noted that "regardless of whether eco-
nomic times are good or bad, some amount ofjob turnover is an
inescapable fact of life in a dynamic market economy."'12 This
observation brings to mind the lessons of history in the U.S. each
time one doomsayer group or another warns of the threat of
chronic job shortages. Looking back at the last fifty years, many
key developments slashed demand for particular types of labor,
including the deregulation of transportation, energy, and tele-
communications, as well as labor-saving technological innova-
tion, such as containerization replacing longshoremen, factory-
floor robots trading places with assembly-line workers, computers
supplanting back-office clerks, and voice mail taking the place of
receptionists. 129 However, despite all of this fluctuation in jobs,
no chronic shortage of jobs ever materialized in the U.S.'3 °
Moreover, lowering tariffs on consumer goods would assist
all American consumers, with a proportionately beneficial
impact on the poorest consumers. If one of the goals of the
Anglo-American legal system is to protect the weakest in soci-
ety,131 and poor, disparate consumers have much less bargaining
power than organized laborers in narrow segments of the U.S.
economy, then it seems that decreasing protectionism would
assist those consumers who are unable to organize themselves to
protest increased prices for basic consumer goods.
According to economist Edward Gresser:
At first glance, proposals for tariff reform thus raise a com-
plex ethical question. Should a relatively small number of
light manufacturing workers bear a special burden as the
country raises living standards for the poor by cutting tar-
iffs? Alternatively, should millions of single mothers and
their children-maids, secretaries, restaurant cashiers-
127. KULL ET AL., supra note 2, at 13. This majority increased from a fifty-
six percent majority answering the same question in 1999.
128. LINDSEY, JOB LOSSES, supra note 88, at 11.
129. Id. at 3.
130. Id.
131. "[T]he law is the surest sanctuary, that a man can take, and the
strongest fortresse to protect the weakest of all; lex est tutissima cassis .... "
EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE [AWES OF ENGLAND
55 (F. Hargrave & C. Butler eds., 19th ed. 1832) (1642).
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pay to protect relatively few light manufacturing jobs if tar-
iffs stay in place?
13 2
Nonetheless, Gresser goes on to explain that tariffs are not actu-
ally protecting jobs, as manufacturing employment in the U.S.
seems to be going through a permanent shift, rising in semicon-
ductors, medical technologies, auto manufacturing, and con-
struction equipment, but declining in light industry.' 3 In the
apparel industry, for instance, despite the persistence of high tar-
iffs, employment has been falling since the 1970s.' The mil-
lion-plus jobs that existed in shoe and clothing production in
1992 were cut in half in the next ten years.1 35 This leads to
Gresser's conclusion that "[c] hoices between the jobs of workers
and the living standards of welfare leavers are thus meaning-
less-the current tariff system is failing to protect jobs even as it
depresses living standards."'3 6
Although there is no point in denying the difficulties that
some American workers face in losing their jobs, protectionism
will do little to save many at-risk jobs at the expense of allowing
the American economy to create new jobs. In contrast to the
fears of outsourcing, it is important to remember that the U.S.
gains jobs through the insourcing that is associated with trade in
business services. 137 Finally, according to the WTO and its mem-
bers, "trade is not a zero-sum game." ' It is not the case that an
individual is being harmed just as an individual is being helped
by free trade. The Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve has
noted the following in regard to free trade being one of many
factors impacting the quality of American jobs:
[I] t is doubtful that changes in the pattern of wages in the
U.S. economy can be explained by any single factor-
trends in trade, in population and immigration, in unioni-
zation and labor market competition, in minimum wage
132. GRESSER, TOUGHEST ON THE POOR, supra note 5, at 3.
133. Id. Light manufacturing industries include, inter alia, food process-
ing and parts of the textile industry.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 4.
137. Ferguson, supra note 5.
138. Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO, The Doha Development
Agenda: Sweet Dreams or Slip Slidin' Away?, Address Before the International
Institute of Economics (Feb. 17, 2006), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/newse/sppl-e/sppll9_e.htm; see also OICE OF THE U.S. TRADE RPRE-
SENTATRIE, 2005 TRADE POLICY AGENDA ch. II (2005), available at http://www.
ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/Reports'Publications/2005/2005_Trade_
Policy.Agenda/asset upload file191_7311 .pdf.
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policy, in the skill mix of the labor force, and in technology
all play a role.13 9
As economist Brink Lindsey has noted, job turnover cannot be
undone with trade restrictions.14
0
C. Training Better Workers
Instead of creating trade barriers, it has often been sug-
gested that the appropriate response to the disruptions associ-
ated with trade is to lessen the pain associated with trade
disruptions through enhanced assistance and retraining for dis-
placed workers.14 ' Public policy can ameliorate the pain of eco-
nomic change in the following ways: "It can ease workers'
transitions from one job to another; it can produce better edu-
cated and better trained workers who are capable of filling
higher-paying, more challenging positions; it can promote sound
growth and avoid, or at least minimize, economy-wide slumps." 142
The federal Trade Adjustment Assistance Act of 1974
(TAA),' 4 3 designed for dislocated workers who can show that
their loss of employment is directly trade-related, has been a
targeted program with income maintenance for up to a year
beyond the expiration of unemployment compensation bene-
fits. 1 4 4 The Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002'
has expanded the TAA and provides for payments, allowances
and other benefits for workers and firms who can demonstrate
that they have been adversely impacted by the FTAA and other
FTAS. According to Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.), a sponsor of
the 2002 TAA Reform Act, "Under the expanded TAA program,
the budget has nearly tripled and for the first time workers who




139. Ferguson, supra note 5.
140. LINDSEY, JOB LOSSES, supra note 88, at 11.
141. Ferguson, supra note 5.
142. LINDSEY, JoB LOSSES, supra note 88, at 11.
143. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495 (2004).
144. Katherine A. Hagen, Fundamentals of Labor Issues and NAFTA, 27 U.C.
DAviS L. REV. 917, 933 (1994).
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TRADE PROTECTON VS. TRADE PROMOTION
President Bush's FY 2005 budget proposed $23 billion for
job training and employment assistance as part of a comprehen-
sive plan to better prepare American workers for high-skilled
jobs.'4 7 The President proposed to double the number of work-
ers in federal job training, which is the largest job training pro-
gram in the country.' 48 Additionally, President Bush proposed
to provide $250 million for community colleges that train work-
ers for high-growth jobs.'49 Further, the current administration
tripled the amount of Trade Adjustment Assistance to $1.1 bil-
lion per year in FY 2005 for training and cash benefits for work-
ers dislocated by increased imports or a shift of production to
certain foreign countries. 150 Workers are additionally eligible to
receive a Health Coverage Tax Credit covering sixty-five percent
of the premium for qualified health insurance.
151
The main advantage of assistance programs as opposed to
protectionism is that they moot many of the harshest arguments
against free trade. First, they pinpoint the industries that need
the most help due to the recent economic recession. Although
the steel-producing industry has mainly technological advances
to blame for its continuous decline in jobs, steel producers typi-
cally blame trade for job losses, with severe results. Removing
the blame from trade by alleviating steelworkers' concerns may
enhance public support for free trade, which would create a win-
win situation for American consumers and steelworkers alike.
Second, the protectionism argument would lose its force because
more new jobs would be available in sectors opened up to freer
trade. Third, more jobs in industries that consume currently
protected products would be saved, and the U.S. economy would
receive net benefits from freer trade, which would free up
resources for such worker assistance programs.
V. THE ALTERNATIVE TO PROTECTIONISM: IMPROVING FT'As
The FTAs that the United States signs should strive to elimi-
nate protectionism, particularly in the agricultural and manufac-
turing sectors. The USTR's capitulation to the domestic sugar
industry in negotiating the U.S.-Australia FTA in 2004 caused
American negotiators to have to overlook Australian protection-
147. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Free and Fair Trade: Real
Results in Leveling the Playing Field, http://www.ustr.gov/Document_.Library/
FactSheets/2004/Benefits ofTradetoStates/SectionIndex.html (last vis-
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ism on wheat, broadcasting, audio-visual services, and other
areas. 152 The current draft of the FTAA does not include any
provisions on sugar or steel.15 3 However, it is highly likely that
both the sugar-producing and steel-manufacturing industries will
attempt to place some exceptions in the FTAA in order to pro-
tect their products from foreign competition. Such provisions
would be a mistake for American workers in industries that con-
sume these products and would also keep prices artificially high
for all American consumers. Hence, negotiators should strive to
keep steel and sugar on the table during the next round of FTAA
negotiations rather than allow a small group of beneficiaries of
protectionist programs to hijack American progress in opening
markets.
Another way to improve future FTAs is to eliminate the pos-
sibility of using trade remedy measures, such as anti-dumping,
54
countervailing duties, 5  and safeguard measures,156 which
reduce many of the positive aspects of free trade. Many recently
negotiated trade agreements around the world have begun to
limit the use of such measures within the FTA or customs union.
One analyst notes the following with respect to this trend:
Although imposition of trade remedy measures are legally
allowed under the relevant WTO Agreements if certain cri-
teria are met, it also has been widely acknowledged that,
on one hand, they can protect the domestic industries
damaged by foreign imports, and, on the other hand, they
harm domestic consumers, domestic downstream industries, and
foreign exporting industries, by increasing the commodity
price and by creating an unstable trade environment and
trade distorting effects.
1 57
In NAFTA, each member country has the ability to apply its anti-
dumping and countervailing duty laws to goods imported from
152. LuK~s, supra note 60.
153. Free Trade Area of the Americas Draft Agreement, ch. IX, sec. B,
art. 6 (Nov. 21, 2003), available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/
ChapterIXe.asp. Article 6.1 states: "The Parties agree that, as of the entry into
force of this Agreement, they shall not apply the special safeguard measures for
agricultural products referred to in Article 5 of the WTO Agreement on Agri-
culture." Id. Article 6.3 states: "Only the Parties with small economies in the
hemisphere may apply special safeguard mechanisms for agricultural products."
Id.
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the territory of any other party.' 58 Some researchers have noted
that the United States has used anti-dumping measures to pro-
tect domestic industries in NAFTA, and, similarly, Brazil has uti-
lized anti-dumping as a trade measure in the MERCOSUR
customs union. 159 According to the third draft text of the FTAA,
Chapter XV on subsidies, anti-dumping and countervailing
duties contains an option for the abolition of anti-dumping mea-
sures for intra-trade, 6 ° which is a positive step in the direction of
truly liberalizing trade and not allowing countries to impose arbi-
trary protectionist restrictions on trade.
CONCLUSION
The USTR should utilize free trade agreements such as the
proposed FTAA to open trade in protected sectors in order to
allow more Americans to retain their jobs in industries that con-
sume protected goods as well as lower prices for all American
consumers. FTAs have the potential to consolidate the benefits
of true free trade for consumers in the U.S. and abroad by lower-
ing barriers that lead to artificially high prices. The proper
response to the latest recession should not be to close our doors
to outside trade but to embrace the benefits that free trade can
bring, especially in regard to shifting the flexible U.S. labor mar-
ket to other, more profitable sectors for the long-run. Currently,
the USTR is negotiating FTAs with Malaysia, Panama, the Repub-
lic of Korea, the Southern African Customs Union, Thailand,
and the United Arab Emirates, in addition to the sporadic nego-
tiations of the FTAA as well as the broader Middle East Free
Trade Initiative. 61 By negotiating more liberal FTAs, the USTR
can save current American jobs as well as create new ones
through the process of insourcing. Current USTR Robert
Portman has shown a willingness to use FrAs to lower barriers.
Because the debate surrounding free trade is relevant, the
negotiators of the FTAA have expressed a willingness to listen to
all sides of the debate and take views from labor groups and envi-
158. Id. at 15-16.
159. AZEVEDO ET AL., supra note 70, at 60.
160. See Free Trade Area of the Americas Draft Agreement ch. XV, art. 13
(Nov. 21, 2003), available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraftO3/Chapter
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ronmentalists, among others, into account. 6 2 Although reduc-
ing barriers to protected sectors may hasten the process of
inevitable job losses in those sectors, FTAs can save jobs in sectors
that use those formerly protected goods as well as create newjobs
in other growing fields of the U.S. economy. Additionally, open-
ing trade across the board rather than creating a patchwork of
protected and non-protected goods will end the perceived Amer-
ican hypocrisy on trade, 6 3 which occurs when U.S. trading part-
ners question U.S. commitment to free trade after seeing U.S.
protectionism of certain industries. An understanding of the
relationship between successful FTAs and the American labor
market can inform future policymaking and ensure that the
American economy continues to grow and compete at the global
level.
162. See Free Trade Area of the Americas Homepage, http://www.ftaa-
alca.org/alca e.asp (last visited Apr. 21, 2006) (encouraging discussion with
various groups).
163, Leaders of the developing world often bring this charge against the
United States and Europe because of their protection of agricultural goods. See
Marian L. Tupy, Letter to the Editor, Who Pays for Farm Subsidies?, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 2005, at A23.
